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(Under the direction of Holger Moroff) 
 
This thesis will examine the interplay between organized criminal networks and 
terrorist organizations. Increasingly since the end of the Cold War, these groups, 
previously thought to be incompatible with each other, have begun to work together to 
achieve their missions. As Tamara Makarenko demonstrated with her 2004 crime-terror 
continuum, there is significant variation in the level of cooperation between criminals and 
terrorists. This thesis will further explore their relationship in an effort to understand the 
ways they work together. The case studies of al-Qaeda, Mexican drug cartels, the 
Albanian Mafia, and the FARC will be utilized as examples of the varying levels of 
cooperation between criminals and terrorists. By studying these examples, one can see 
that the relationship in question has evolved over time and not only has a new continuum 
been created, but that there are implications for governments seeking to combat crime 
and terror.  
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The end of the Cold War brought with it a new phenomenon in the relationship 
between organized crime and terrorism. Two groups that were traditionally kept separate 
from each other began to cooperate to achieve their goals. Continuing into the present 
day, this relationship has grown and become more solidified. To explore this relationship, 
Tamara Makarenko, in 2004, proposed a crime-terror continuum. She set forth different 
levels of cooperation between the groups, ranging from simple alliances through to 
convergence of methods and tactics within one group. This thesis will examine the 
validity of Makarenko’s continuum through the use of case studies, focusing on the 
convergence phenomenon. First, the examples of the FARC in Colombia and Albanian 
mafias will give examples of convergent hybrid groups. Then, it will examine the 
behavior of Mexican cocaine cartels and al-Qaeda as examples of groups that regularly 
move along the continuum, changing their behaviors to fit their needs. By studying these 
four groups, it will become clear that Makarenko’s original classifications are still 
relevant but her representation of these classifications on a continuum may not be 
dimensional enough to truly portray the relationship between crime and terror. To address 
this limitation, a new diagram will be proposed to better explain the crime- terror nexus. 
Finally, there will be a brief discussion on what governments can do to combat both 
crime and terrorism.  
	  
	  	   2	  
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS 
 
There is a lot of literature that credits the end of the Cold War with sparking the 
relationship between crime and terror. One must question, however, what specifically 
caused to the two groups that, at first glance, should be diametrically opposed to 
cooperation to work together. This time period is recognized as the end of state-
sponsored terrorism, forcing terrorist groups to seek out other forms of financing. One 
way in which they did this was to turn to organized crime groups. They adopted their 
methods, worked together and shared funds, or in some cases, terrorist organizations 
extorted money from criminal groups through the imposition of “revolutionary taxation 
(Bovenkerk and Chakra, 2007, pg. 33).” Thus, the crime-terror nexus was created. 
Similarly, more stringent legislation and enforcement regarding organized criminal 
activity upset criminal operations and forced groups to take action against governments. 
Another side effect of the end of the Cold War was the creation of several weak or failing 
states that criminals and terrorists alike could manipulate into becoming a safe haven for 
their operations.  Other scholars cite globalization as the spark that began the cooperation 
between the two. That is, by removing the borders that traditionally contained terrorists 
and criminals to any one area, they are more likely to move around and are, as a result, 
more likely to cross paths with each other. Further, they both operate in the secrecy of the 
underworld of legitimate society. They use the same infrastructure and the same tactics to 
achieve their goals.  By virtue of existing the same space, they are likely to cooperate. 
Adding to this, the creation of emigrant and refugee communities around the world has 
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resulted in places that can simultaneously be used as recruitment bases and hiding places 
for illegal raised money (Bovenkerk and Chakra, 2007). Another explanantion is their 
common enemy- the state. More specifically, both groups have interests in disrupting law 
enforcement. This shared enemy could result in cooperation. By partnering with terrorists 
or adopting terrorist tactics, organized criminals can disrupt the governance of the host 
country and destabilize the political structure, thus limiting their opportunities for 
international cooperation, as well as interrupt law enforcement capabilities (Shelley, 
1999). Beginning as a series of partnerships and alliances, criminals and terrorists slowly 
converged in methods and motives and adopted the characteristics of one another.  
 To be certain, the post-Cold War environment has resulted in increased 
cooperation between the two elements as well as an increased interest and study in the 
phenomenon. Furthermore, on September 28, 2001, following the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center, the United Nations Security Council adopted a wide ranging 
resolution against terrorism, including language regarding the concern for the “close 
connection between international terrorism and traditional organized crime (as quoted in 
Bovenkerk and Chakra, 2007, pg. 30).” It is clear that there is not only an ever-deepening 
connection between the groups, but also a widening concern regarding the combined 
capabilities of the groups. 
 In her 2004 article on the evolving partnership between organized crime and 
terrorism, Tamara Makarenko created the crime-terror continuum, diagramming the 
varying levels of cooperation between these two groups. On either end of the spectrum 
are organized crime and terrorism. At these two points, a group is distinctly one or other- 
a classification one would be hard pressed to find today. The next stop along the 
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continuum is temporary alliances between organized crime groups and terrorist 
organizations. These alliances vary in nature and can be one-off, short-term, or long-term. 
There are also a variety of reasons for these alliances, including, but not limited to, the 
pursuit of expert knowledge regarding topics such as money-laundering and bomb 
making, and operational support commonly evidenced by sharing of smuggling routes.  
Examples of alliances between criminal and terrorist organizations are plenty. For 
example, to facilitate safe travel throughout Europe, al-Qaeda has turned to the Italian 
mafias. One way in which their alliance has manifested is through the use of safe houses 
belonging to the Neopolitan Camorra by al-Qaeda operatives. The Camorra also provided 
falsified travel documents to help the terrorist organization move throughout Europe 
(Pontoniere, 2005). Al-Qaeda has also been linked to Bosnian criminal organizations to 
transport heroin from Afghanistan into Europe (Makarenko, 2004). The next step along 
Makarenko’s crime-terror continuum is the adoption of tactics. In this phases, rather than 
outsourcing to another group, a terrorist organization actually employs the methodologies 
of criminals themselves and vice versa. As the 1990s progressed, the adoption of 
strategies became increasingly common. Crime and terror groups sought to “mutate their 
own structure and organization to take on a non-traditional, financial, or political role, 
rather than cooperate with groups who are already effective in those activities (Dishman, 
2001, pg. 48).” What differentiates these groups from the next stage, convergence, is that 
they still very clearly identify with their original motivations, either political change or 
financial gain through criminal methods. For terrorists, the most commonly borrowed 
criminal tactic is drug trafficking for the purpose of raising funds, as can be seen by 
ETA’s forays into the illicit narcotics industry (Makarenko, 2003). Beyond drug 
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trafficking, terrorists have been known to adopt other forms of crime. For example, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have been known to engage in human smuggling and 
al-Qaeda extensively uses credit card fraud throughout Europe (Makarenko, 2003). 
Conversely, organized criminal groups have also been known to temporarily adopt 
terrorist tactics. Consider the Italian Mafias. It cannot be argued that their motives have 
ever significantly strayed from financial to political for extended periods of time. 
However, in the 1990s, the Italian Mafia used terrorist tactics, such as bombings, in 
response to the Italian government’s Anti-Mafia Commission. These bombings were 
meant to “subvert anti-mafia actions and legislative moves… and send a message to the 
‘powers-that-be (Gorka, 2000).’” These acts were certainly political in nature. 
Furthermore, the mafia has made forays into politics through its clientelistic practices and 
by putting members into political offices. However, the motives for this behavior are still 
predominately monetary gain and furtherance of the criminal mission. The final point 
along the crime-terror continuum is convergence. At this stage, criminal and terror 
organizations “could converge into a single entity that initially displays characteristics of 
both groups simultaneously; but has the potential to transform itself into an entity situated 
at the opposite end of the continuum from which it began (Makarenko, 2004, pg. 135).” 
In this stage, the group’s aims and motives have changed to such an extent that they can 
no longer be classified the same way. Makarenko (2003, 2004) identifies three types of 
convergence: political crime, commercial terrorism, and the “black hole.” Groups 
classified as “political crime” are criminal groups displaying political motivations. 
Conversely, “commercial terrorism” occurs when terrorists who are equally interested in 
gaining profits by criminal means. These groups will continue to purport their original 
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political motivations for the sake of sustaining a support base, but their operations will 
largely reflect a desire to make money. At the very center of the crime-terror continuum 
is what Makarenko calls the “black hole.” This point represents a failed state situation, 
where political conflict is perpetuated for the sake of making money. States in the “black 
hole” have been taken over by a criminal or terrorist group with a financial interest in 
maintaining political chaos. States that may fall into this category include Afghanistan, 
Angola, Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan (Makarenko, 2004). The convergence phenomenon 
is increasingly relevant to the contemporary political landscape. It is becoming 
increasingly common for groups to balance both political and financial motives. As a 
result, the way governments choose to pursue criminal and terrorist organizations will 
need to be adapted to maximize effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
(SEE APPENDIX A) 
 
Early literature on the crime-terror partnership argued that long-term alliances 
moving toward the eventual convergence of crime and terror was not possible due to 
irreconcilable differences in the founding motives. Dishman (2001) argued that in spite of 
working together to accomplish short-term objectives, criminals and terrorists are 
incapable of overcoming their fundamental difference in objectives. Criminals are profit-
driven and any action they take is done so to protect their financial assets; conversely, 
terrorists seek fundamental political change. The groups may enter short-term 
partnerships in furtherance of these goals, but the differences in objectives are so 
fundamental that they cannot be overcome. When the entire driving premise of an 
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organization is either financial gain or political change, it is not possible to change this in 
order to allow room for another goal. However, the post- 9/11 global political landscape 
has shown that convergence is not only possible, but it is becoming increasingly common 
and necessary. Political criminals and commercial terrorists are indeed possible because, 
in convergence, the group is not abandoning their founding principle. Rather, they are 
adopting a secondary goal with significant driving power that is critical to their survival. 
With changing legislation and stricter enforcement of laws, organized crime groups can 
no longer survive unless they involve themselves in politics. Similarly, terrorists no 
longer receive funding from the state and money-laundering laws makes posing as 
charities increasingly difficult. Instead, they are forced to adopt criminal measures. 
Existence exclusively as an organized crime group or terrorist organization in the 
traditional sense is no longer possible. Furthermore, there are certain similarities between 
the groups that does allow for cooperation, despite their fundamental differences. Both 
criminal and terrorist organizations: are traditionally rational actors (modern terrorist 
organizations, namely al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups, may not fit with this 
characteristic, as evidenced by their unrealistic political goals and use of irrational 
behaviors such as suicide attacks), use extreme violence with the threat of reprisals, use 
kidnappings, assignations, and extortion, operate secretly, defy the state and the rule of 
law, have fairly permanent memberships (that is, for a member to leave is rare and often 
fatal), present an asymmetrical threat to national security, have interchangeable 
recruitment tools, and are highly adaptive and resilient (Sanderson, 2004). It is clear that 
despite their key differences in motivation, there are enough similarities to allow for 
cooperation.




Before examination of the case studies can begin, it would be helpful to establish 
definitions of what terrorism and organized crime are. This will help in the classification 
of the groups used for the case studies.  
 The definition of terrorism often varies based on the audience and situation. As a 
result, securing a definition that is universally accepted and applicable is a challenge that 
has not yet been overcome. That is not to say, however, that classifying actions as an act 
of terrorism has been a challenge. For example, the United Nations, despite years of 
discussion and negotiations, has struggled to produce an agreeable definition of terrorism 
and, as a result, has been unable to issue a treaty or convention on the prevention of 
terrorism. Rather, politicians and legal scholars have no problem declaring something a 
terrorist incident. Despite this, some sort of working definition of terrorism is necessary 
in a discussion on the subject. Without a global consensus on what constitutes terrorism, 
international action cannot be taken to further efforts of prevention. Furthermore, for this 
particular discussion, parameters around which to classify terrorism is crucial for 
determining what can be called terrorism as opposed to what is simply crime. A clear 
delineation will make the construction of a crime-terror nexus simpler.  In its most basic 
form, terrorism can be defined as “violence or threatened violence intended to produce 
fear or change (Simonsen and Spindlove, 2004, p. 6).” This definition is directed toward 
groups operating outside of the control of a state, not groups operating as official state-
sponsored organizations that could be considered to employ terrorist- like practices.   
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However, a complete definition must also include a mention of political motivations, as 
this is the most commonly cited differentiation between terrorism and criminal violence. 
To address this, the definition given by Harmonie Toros in a 2008 article presents a more 
complete picture. In giving her definition, she compared and analyzed the many 
variations of the definition of terrorism and was able to extract three common, decisive 
characteristics: “(1) a violent means (2) aimed at triggering political change (3) by 
affecting a larger audience than its immediate target (Toros, 2008, p. 409).” This 
definition is useful because it pulls together an overview of the existing literature and 
simplifies it down to the core elements. Further, it would be difficult to argue that any of 
these three characteristics did not belong in a definition of terrorism. It can also be 
applied to the civil war and conflict situations that are characteristic of Makarenko’s 
black hole scenario. This definition will be used to classify groups as terrorist 
organizations. 
 Organized crime is also difficult to define. It also carries the added challenge of 
being conceptually tied to the widely varying laws of countries; that is, what is criminal 
in some places may be acceptable in others and can carry varying levels of severity.  
Consider the example of money laundering. This practice is so difficult to track and 
prevent because of the laws on banking and finance vary so widely from country to 
country. Similarly, the legal parameters that define organized crime vary across borders. 
The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime sets forth an internationally 
accepted definition of organized crime. It states that an “organized crime group shall 
mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting 
in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established 
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in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial 
or other material benefit.” The FBI defines organized crime as “any group having some 
manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to maintain their 
position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or 
extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales, region, or 
the country as a whole.” In addition to these definitions, Abadinsky offers eight 
characteristics of organized crime groups: 1) have no political goals; 2) are hierarchical; 
3) have a limited or exclusive membership; 4) constitute a unique subculture; 5) 
perpetuate themselves; 6) exhibit a willingness to use illegal violence; 7) are 
monopolistic; 8) are governed by explicit rules and regulations (Abadinsky, 2010, pg. 3).  
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As a group, al-Qaeda presents an interesting case study into the fluidity of the 
crime-terror continuum. On this phenomenon, Makarenko (2003) writes:  
The CTC is referred to as a continuum precisely because it may be used to trace, 
past, current and the potential future evolution of organized crime and/ or 
terrorism. It also alludes to the fact that a single group can slide up and down the 
scale depending on the environment in which it operates (emphasis added, pg. 
163).  
In making this remark, Makarenko comments on the necessity of adaptability for 
survival. It is clear that groups must be able to change their mission to fit the 
environments in which they find themselves operating.  
 Beginning at the far end of the spectrum, al-Qaeda is undeniably a terrorist 
organization. From inception, their motive has been to impose sharia law around the 
world. With origins tracing back to 1987, the al-Qaeda network was formed by Abdullah 
Azzam for the purpose of forming al-qaeda al-sulbah- “a vanguard of the strong (Burke, 
2004, pg. 18).” Azzam envisioned a network of Muslim activists, acting independently to 
set the example for the Muslim world and to empower the believers against their 
oppressors. The network gained formal recognition as a terrorist organization in 1998 
during an investigation by the FBI into the U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa. For a 
period of time following this incident, bin Laden and his partners were able to create a 
loose structure for the organization, linking together different Islamic militant groups, 
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and acting in unison toward a common goal. Though the goal of imposing a worldwide 
system of law may not have been the most rational, they operated, for the most part, as a 
rational being in terms of structure and leadership. Today, however, this structure has 
been destroyed and the organization has once again taken on the appearance of a loose 
knit coalition of radicals working toward a common goal. Rather than operating as a 
terrorist organization in the traditional sense, the al-Qaeda worldview, “sustained by anti-
Western, anti-Zionist, and anti-Semitic rhetoric,” continues to drive operatives to act in 
furtherance of their common goal (Burke, 2004, pg. 18).  Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, 
considered to be an official al-Qaeda spokesman, confirmed this common goal when he 
posted the following on an official al-Qaeda website: 
How can [he] possibly [accept humiliation and inferiority] when he knows that 
the [divine] rule is that the entire earth must be subject to the religion of Allah- 
not to the East, not to the West- to no ideology and to no path except for the path 
of Allah? (as quoted in Williams, 2005, pg. 17) 
The al-Qaeda organization has pursued many strategies and tactics to achieve this goal. 
The most notable of which is the plane hijackings and attacks on the World Trade Center 
on September 11, 2001. Other attacks that the group has taken credit for include, but are 
not limited to, the 2000 USS Cole bombing, 2002 Bali bombings, 2005 London transport 
bombings, and the 2008 Islamabad Marriott hotel bombings.  
 In order to further their mission, al-Qaeda has also been known to pursue alliances 
with organized crime groups. The reasons for this are varied and have taken on differing 
levels of involvement based on the needs of the group at the time.  At merely the 
transactional level, the organization’s desire for weapons of mass destruction have led to 
repeated contact with various criminal groups. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, 
Osama bin Laden, acting as the leader of al-Qaeda, pursued several leads in order to 
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obtain materials to build nuclear weapons, including cooperating with Chechens, 
Ukrainian arms dealer Semion Mogilevich, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 
Bulgarian businessman Ivan Ivanov, and the Russian Mafia (McCloud, Ackerman, and 
Bale, 2005 and Williams, 2005). Al-Qaeda’s alliances with organized crime also move 
beyond the weapons trade. In Europe, al-Qaeda extensively relies on partnerships with 
the Italian mafia to continue operating under the radar of law enforcement. Italian media 
has revealed that AQIM send operatives throughout Europe using a network of safe 
houses set up and run by the Neapolitan Camorra in exchange for large amounts of 
narcotics. The Camorra reportedly also provide forged documents and weapons for 
AQIM operatives (Pontoniere, 2005). Another example of al-Qaeda’s alliances with 
organized crime can be seen in their presence in the Balkan region. Evidence suggests 
that they have cooperated with the Albanian mafia and other organized crime groups in 
Eastern Europe to establish training camps, to utilize trafficking routes, and to infiltrate 
Western Europe. Furthermore, building projects in Albania have been identified as 
money laundering fronts for al-Qaeda. (Wilson Center). Connections have also been 
made between al-Qaeda and Mexican cartels, both in the drug trade and as a way for 
terrorist operatives to find their way into the United States (Ehrenfeld, 2011).  
 Specifically within Africa, al-Qaeda’s alliance with organized crime has had the 
opportunity to become even more developed thanks to the poor governance and weak 
rule of law that has become systemic in the region. As evidenced by Mali, al-Qaeda’s 
relationship with organized crime has become so strongly developed that the terrorist 
group is beginning to take a tangible hold and seize control in parts of the region. In fact, 
Northern Mali has come to represent the world’s largest al-Qaeda controlled territory 
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(Chilson, 2013). Drug traffickers throughout West Africa have used the funds raised from 
the narcotics trade to support the al-Qaeda mission. Research groups are reporting that 
traffickers have aligned themselves with AQIM, using their profits to purchase weapons 
and fund radical activities. More specifically, a 2012 report by the African Center for 
Strategic Studies reports that AQIM has partially funded their activities in Mali through 
“profits from drug and cigarette trafficking and hostage ransoms (UN Integrated Regional 
Information Networks, 2013).”  The relationship between drug traffickers and AQIM has 
been traced to a meeting between Colombian drug lords and members of AQIM in 
Guinea-Bissau, suggests a 2010 report from Sahel Intelligence (loc. cit.).    
 Al-Qaeda’s alliances with drug traffickers in Africa is just part of the 
organization’s involvement in the drug trade. In Afghanistan, the group has also been 
known to play a more active role in heroin trafficking. This practice represents a shift 
from forming alliances to adoption of operational practices, a move closer to convergence 
on the crime-terror continuum. Furthermore, the drug trade represents more than a source 
of funding for the group; rather, despite the fact that drug use is contrary to the practice of 
Islam, the terrorist organization has used drug trafficking as a weapon in their war against 
the West. A defense official for the US told the Washington Times “bin Laden does not 
mind trafficking in drugs, even though it’s against the teaching of Islam, because it’s 
being used to kill Westerners (as quoted in Gartenstein-Ross and Dabruzzi, 2007).” In the 
case of Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has been known to play a large role in regulating the 
growing and distribution of heroin. In cooperation with the Taliban, al-Qaeda has taxed 
poppy growers and distributers of opium base, as well as provided security for the crops. 
Furthermore, DEA sources have suggested that following the toppling of the Taliban, al-
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Qaeda gave large sums of money to Afghan farmers to increase their production 
(Ehrenfeld, 2005). Moving beyond the drug trade, al-Qaeda has also turned to the 
abduction of foreign nationals to make money. This shift in modus operandi was seen in 
2003, when Algerian terrorist leader Abdul-Razzaq al-Para kidnapped a group of over 30 
European tourists in the Algerian Sahara. In order to secure the release of the tourists, 
Germany agreed to pay $5 million. This set a pattern for abductions as a money making 
venture and has generated millions of dollars of profit for the group (al-Shafey, 2011).  
 The group is doing more than just trafficking drugs for the sake of raising money. 
Recent behavior may suggest that they are temporarily shelving their political aims for 
the sake of preservation of the group. Following the assignation of Osama bin Laden, 
coupled with the elimination of several other key leaders, it could be said that the group 
is severely weakened. It would seem that their recent activity suggests an interest in self-
preservation, rather than an active pursuit of their political agenda. This might begin to 
suggest convergence. For some off-shoots of al-Qaeda, such as Abu Sayyaf, the 
convergence hypothesis is becoming more and more of a reality as the group strays 




Whereas al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization that displays adaptability based on 
the circumstances of operation, Mexican drug cartels have come to represent organized 
crime groups that are equally adaptable. To be certain, Mexican drug cartels have found 
themselves operating at many points along the crime-terror continuum, relying on 
alliances and adoption of operational tactics to stay in business. These groups have come 
	  	  16	  
to represent the epitome of “narco-terrorism.” They are a financially driven terrorist 
organization that will stop at nothing to protect their profits.  
 The prominence of Mexican cartels arose out of the crackdown of law 
enforcement onto South American cartels, namely Colombian cocaine cartels. Once the 
Colombian Medellin and Cali cartels were for the most part eliminated by the War on 
Drugs in the 1990s, Mexican cartels stepped into fill the void they left behind. Mexican 
drug cartels are definitively profit-motivated. The primary objective in all action is to 
protect the drug trade and protect their profits. The cartels recognized as dominating the 
market include: the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, the Juarez Cartel, the 
Tijuana Cartel, and Beltran Leyva (Hossain and G.V., 2011). The groups exist in fierce 
competition with each other, each trying to secure the largest portion of the market. The 
majority of their drugs- namely marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin- are 
exported to the United States, however Mexican cocaine is more and more moving 
toward Europe- a market traditionally dominated by Colombian cartels (Keefe, 2012).  
 
Since the early days of business, Mexican cartels allied themselves with the Colombian 
FARC. Colombian defense officials have reported that the Mexican cartels, filling the 
voids for the predominately defunct Colombian cartels, are purchasing their cocaine from 
the FARC (Associated Press, 2008). As they have become more established in the drug 
trafficking industry, Mexican cartels have begun working with other organized crime 
groups in Europe to expand their market. Ties have been made between Mexican drug 
cartels and the Italian Mafia to supply cocaine to Europe. Specifically, Mexican cartels 
have been cooperating with the Sicilian mafia to import cocaine through the port of 
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Palermo (O’Reilly, 2012). Ties have also been established between the cartels and the 
‘Nhdrangheta and the Cosa Nostra in order to supply Europe with cocaine. Mexican 
cartels have also been known to cooperate with criminal groups in Mozambique, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, and Nigeria, using these countries as transit 
points for their product (O’Reilly, 2012). Mexican cartel alliances are not purely 
criminal, though. As previously mentioned, al-Qaeda has teamed up with the Mexican 
cartels to gain entry into the United States. Furthermore, Hezbollah has been linked to the 
Mexican cartels, best explained by the large Lebanese diaspora in Latin America (US 
House Committee on Homeland Security Report, 2012). This alliance goes beyond drug 
trafficking to include human smuggling and arms trafficking aimed at furthering the 
missions of Islamic terrorist organizations. Furthermore, Middle Eastern Islamic terrorist 
organizations, like Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, are expressing growing interests in aligning 
with Mexican cartels because of the access it would afford into the United States for 
future attacks (loc. cit.).   
 Mexican drug cartels have also made forays into what could be considered 
terrorist activity, bringing them closer to the middle of the crime-terror continuum and 
closer to convergence. The outbreak of violence has been traced to 2006, when gunmen 
threw five human heads onto the dance floor of a nightclub, then left a scrawled message 
announcing the arrival of a new cartel. Over the course of ten days in May 2012, 81 
beheaded bodies were found in Mexico, no doubt meant to serve as a message asserting 
the dominance and power of the drug cartels (Grant, 2012b). The criminal network Los 
Zetas has since come to represent the use of violence as a terror tactic to achieve their 
pecuniary goals and, in some cases, to sway politicians and law enforcers in their favor, 
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followed in recognition by the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels. Beheadings and other gruesome 
murders serve a dual purpose for the cartels. On the one hand, it sends a message to rival 
groups, asserting their own dominance over a territory. On the other hand, it sends a 
message to politicians. The timing of the increase in violence cannot be ignored. It was 
not a coincidence that the 81 bodies previously mentioned were found just six weeks 
before a presidential election where every candidate said they would not be negotiating 
with the cartels (Grant, 2012b.) Rather, the bodies were meant to reassert the dominance 
and power of the drug cartels. Furthermore, they also serve to strike fear among ordinary 
people. Gonzalez Ruiz, a former State Attorney on Organized Crime in Mexico said of 
the cartel violence:  
"The message is clear: we have no mercy, and we will do whatever it takes to 
control our territory," … Mr Gonzalez Ruiz uses a word the government has been 
loathe to use in association with the country's drug violence: terrorism. "You can 
only call this strategy (of beheading the victims) a terrorist's strategy. It's 
terrorism because it sends a threat to the population: 'if you don't allow us to 
control our illegal business, we will do the same to you' (as quoted in Grant, 
2012b)." 
To put the seriousness of Mexican cartel violence and drug activity into perspective, 
sources have claimed that following the assignation of Osama bin Laden, Joaquin 
Guzman, also known as El Chapo and recognized as the leader of the Sinaloa drug cartel, 
became the most wanted man in the world (Grant, 2012a). Another terrorist tactic utilized 
by the cartels includes political assignations. For example, the Sinaloa cartel has been 
credited with the 2009 assignation of General Julian Aristides Gonzalez, a senior counter-
narcotics officer for Honduras (Burton, 2010). This act can definitely be seen as terrorist 
in nature, given its clearly political overtones. By seeking out government officials who 
attempt to limit cartel drug activity and by attempting to influence policy, the cartels are 
creating political goals and taking action to achieve them. Their political involvement, 
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however, is limited to what is necessary to defend their drug trade. That is what keeps 
them from crossing the spectrum to be classified as terrorists. They never abandon their 
financial motivations, and any attempts to change government are for the sake of 
preserving their drug trade. 
 Whereas al-Qaeda and Mexican drug cartels have been used to demonstrate 
groups that move along the continuum, the Albanian mafia and FARC demonstrate 
groups that have reached the convergence stage. They represent an organized crime 
group and a terrorist group that are caught at the middle of the continuum and are making 
significant strides toward the opposite end.   
 
The Albanian Mafia 
 
The rise of the Albanian Mafia can be credited to two main factors: geography 
and political conditions. The Balkan route is one of the most widely utilized routes for 
trafficking into Europe. It has been used for drugs, weapons, and humans and has been 
used by criminal and terrorist groups alike. Reports suggest that more than 80 percent of 
Europe’s heroin passes along the Balkan route as a stop on the “Golden Crescent.” The 
popularity of this route is partially credited to the fact that the intercept rate of heroin, as 
reported by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, is much lower (2 percent interception 
rate) than those in other drug trafficking countries (10 percent in Turkey and 18 percent 
in Iran) (UNODC, 2010). Albanian Mafias are not only involved in heroin; that is, 
production laboratories for amphetamines and methamphetamines have been established 
along with a rise in marijuana cultivation (Mutschke, 2000).  Given this proximity to the 
drug trade, the rise of the Albanian Mafia was inevitable. Further, the political conditions 
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of the 1990s allowed the growth of a shadow economy, dealing in both licit and illicit 
goods. Embargoes imposed by NATO created a demand for illegally traded oil, narcotics, 
and weapons. While some thought that war and embargoes would interrupt the trafficking 
routes previously established through the Balkans, the opposite occurred. New routes 
were established to work around the combat and to take advantage of the political 
turmoil. In 1995, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs reported concluded:  
The processes of political and economic change set in motion by the breakup of 
the former USSR and the drive to liberalize the international economy and 
domestic economic transactions have significantly increased the magnitude and 
complexity of illicit drug trafficking (as quoted in Lewis, 1998, pg. 217). 
The Albanian mafia is known for more than drug trafficking. Its also been tied to human 
trafficking, arms trading, contract killing, kidnapping, visa forgery, and burglary (Xhudo, 
1996). The group has also expanded beyond the Albanian borders into Europe and have 
established themselves as a major security threat to the European Union. The Albanian 
diaspora community has helped to establish the Albanian Mafia network throughout the 
world. Reports suggest they are active in Italy, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom with ties to South American drug traffickers, the Italian ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra, 
and Stida, British, Dutch, Irish, Kurdish, Mexican, Nigerian, Polish, Russian, and Serbian 
crime syndicates (European Parliament, 2012). Beyond the criminal dimension of the 
Albanian Mafia, there exists simultaneously a terrorist dimension. This terrorist 
dimension is what makes the Albanian Mafia an example of convergent, hybrid 
organization.  
 The terrorist dimension of the Albanian Mafia is partially explained through an 
alliance. The Albanian Mafia’s relationship with the KLA is one where the two have 
become practically inseparable. It has reached a level of connectedness that makes 
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distinguishing between the two almost impossible. The Albanian Mafia and the KLA 
often work together to pursue the same goals and the Mafia has been critical in supplying 
money and weapons to KLA operations. One report suggests:  
Some of [the drug traffickers] are activists in the armed movement of the KLA 
fighters and have gone home to fight. They feel Albanian. They are fighting to 
achieve annexation to Albania. And it is precisely there that at least a part of the 
sea of money that the Albanian drugs traffickers have amassed is reported to have 
ended up, to support the families and to fund both certain political personalities 
and the anti-Serb movement (Ruscica, 1998). 
Closely identifying with the KLA’s goal of the liberation of Kosovo from Serbia, the 
Albanian Mafia is “intrinsically linked to ‘Panalbanian ideals, politics, military activities, 
and terrorism (Makarenko, 2003, pg. 171).’” Beyond shared ideals and goals, the 
Albanian Mafia and the KLA share both a common membership and recruitment base, 
further asserting the claims that they are “terrorists by day and criminals by night (loc. 
cit.).” These Panalbanian ideals are what tie together the political and the criminal 
motivations of the Albanian Mafia. Because they so closely identify with the plight of the 
Kosovar Albanians, they are motivated to dedicate their profits to the cause of the 
Kosovars. An INTERPOL representative reported “Albanian drug lords established 
elsewhere in Europe began contributing funds to the ‘national cause' in the 80's. From 
1993 on, these funds were to a large extent invested in arms and military equipment for 
the KLA (Mutschke, 2000).”  
 The liberation of Kosovo is not the only reason for the Albanian Mafia’s foray 
into terrorism. In order to protect the value of their shadow market, they have an interest 
in preserving social and political unrest. They seek to produce an environment devoid of 
political calm, an environment closely associated with terrorism. Makarenko’s original 
continuum suggests that the result of convergence of crime and terror, as can be seen in 
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the case of the Albanians, is a “black hole.” Makarenko describes the black hole as being 
a weak or failed state that fosters the convergence of crime and terror and creates a safe 
haven for the continued operation of these hybrid groups. While Albania is not 
necessarily a weak or failed state, it does possess some of the characteristics that are 
easily exploited by hybrid groups for continued operation. It is trademarked with 
corruption and weak rule of law. Because of this, the Albanian Mafia has an interest in 
uniting the people in a perpetual struggle against the state, perpetuating conflict and the 
need for a shadow economy (Mutschke, 2000, Makarenko, 2004). This fits in line with 
Mary Kaldor’s new war hypothesis. According to Kaldor, new wars are usually intrastate 
conflicts, fought by paramilitary groups and insurgencies, rather than by state militaries.  
Furthermore, these conflicts can be exploited by organized crime groups interested in 
perpetuating unrest in order to increase profits (Kaldor, 2007). In the example of Albania, 
the Albanian Mafias can be attributed with struggling against the government and adding 
a terrorist element to their agenda in order to prolong the necessity of an illicit market and 




The FARC is perhaps the strongest example of the convergence theory. The 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC, began as a rebel organization 
composed of communist militants and peasant self- defense groups in 1965. Their 
mission has been to overthrow the government of Colombia. They claim to “represent the 
rural poor against Colombia’s wealthy classes and oppose U.S. influence in Colombia, 
the privatization of natural resources, multinational corporations, and rightist violence 
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(Hanson, 2009).” The FARC is the largest and best-equipped rebel group in Colombia. It 
has an area of operations that span roughly one-third of the country. In addition to 
fighting the legitimate Colombian armed forces, the group kidnaps Colombian officials 
and foreign citizens. Since the death of Jacobo Arenas, the ideological leader of FARC, 
the group deepened its participation in criminal activities (Makarenko, 2004).  
 In order to finance their mission, the organization turned to cocaine trafficking. 
When the Cali and Medellin cartels were taken down in the 1990s, the FARC survived 
and was able to take over much of the Colombian cocaine market. It is estimated that 
FARC is able to generate between $500 million and $600 million from the illegal drug 
trade. A 2006 indictment from the US Department of Justice reported that FARC was 
responsible in some way for more than 50 percent of the world’s cocaine.  The level of 
involvement in the drug trade varies between FARC units, ranging from protecting the 
crops to overseeing production to acting as middlemen in international distribution. As 
the group increased their profits in the drug trade, they were also able to increase the 
amount of land they controlled and increase their power over the countryside. By 2000, it 
was estimated that the group controlled 40 percent of Colombian territory (Makarenko, 
2004).  They also make money through kidnapping for ransom, extortion schemes, and an 
unofficial tax levied on families in the countryside for protection and social services that 
the state may not adequately provide (Hanson, 2009). It is clear that despite possessing a 
public image as a terrorist organization and purporting a political mission, the group is 
deeply entrenched in organized crime. They have taken on a role similar to the mafia in 
parts of Italy; that is, they have made forays into politics (for example, through providing 
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social services) but only to raise money for the organization. Scholars such as Paul 
Wilkinson have suggested FARC’s deep involvement in criminal activity  
has made them, both in reality and popular perception, little more than a branch of 
organized crime, decadent guerrillas rather than genuine revolutionaries, 
irredeemably corrupted by their intimate involvement with narco- traffickers and 
their cynical pursuits of huge profits from kidnapping and from their ‘protection’ 
of coca and opium production, processing, and shipping facilities (as quoted in 
Makarenko, 2004, pg. 137).  
Thus, FARC has come to represent the epitome of Makarenko’s convergence thesis. In 
her description of the continuum, she remarks that in the convergence stage, it will be 
possible for a group to switch to the opposite end of the continuum. In this case, it could 
be argued that while still maintaining a political ideology to appease supporters, the 
group is, in essence, acting as a criminal organization.  
 The question of FARC’s classification as either criminal or terrorist could, 
theoretically, be resolved by the recent development in the political situation in 
Colombia. Efforts on the part of the Colombian government, bolstered by funding from 
the Unites States’ Plan Colombia package, have left the FARC “in a state of strategic 
crisis” following the 2007 assignation of much of the group’s leadership (Isacson, 2008). 
Needing a new strategy to achieve the group’s political goals, FARC and the Colombian 
government entered into informal talks in 2010. Then, in October 2012, formal 
negotiations began in Oslo, Norway, despite the absence of a ceasefire, in an attempt to 
end conflict and reach a compromise. The agenda includes subjects such as “rural 
development, the end of armed conflict, drug trafficking, the rights of victims, and 
political participation (Mosettig, 2012).” As a sign of good faith, the rebel group did 
implement a ceasefire once negotiations resumed in Cuba. The Colombian military, on 
the other hand, continued to attack the FARC camps. Currently, the negotiations are 
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ongoing. Forecasts regarding the outcome of the talks are less than hopeful, with the topic 
of land reform being the trickiest of all. The dismal outlook stems from the ongoing 
violence perpetrated by both the FARC, who abandoned their ceasefire on January 20, 
2013, and the Colombian military (BBC News, 2013). As just one attempt in a long 
history of peace talks and measures to end the conflict, the outcome of this latest round of 
negotiations is difficult to predict and remains to be seen.  
 If they are successful, though, the impact on the group’s existence will an 
interesting case study in the convergence theory. The group has been operating 
concurrently as a crime and terrorist organization for quite some time. Assuming the 
negotiations produce a peaceful settlement, the group’s political motivations will, for the 
most part, be achieved. They will no longer need to pursue terrorist tactics. It remains to 
be seen whether they will give up the profits obtained from the drug trade. Their deep 
involvement in the drug trade and the massive profits accrued from illegal activity, 
however, would suggest that they will continue to operate as an organized crime group. 
With scholars already suggesting that they are no longer as politically motivated as they 
once were, it stands to reason that the group may use a peace resolution as an opportunity 
to officially make the switch from terrorism to crime.
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V. THE NEXUS REVISITED 
 
The above case studies are a sampling of the most active and well-known terrorist 
and criminal organizations operating around the world today. They also all have the 
added dimension of operating transnationally, a trait that is fairly unique to modern day 
groups compared to the traditional crime and terror groups that operated before and 
during the Cold War. As they come to occupy the same spaces and encounter the same 
roadblocks created by new legislation and law enforcement efforts, criminals and 
terrorists have been forced to cooperate in ways previously unknown. Makarenko’s 2004 
continuum shows the varying levels of cooperation that typify modern organized crime 
groups and terrorist organizations. Makarenko’s original crime-terror continuum served 
as an excellent starting point in diagramming this new phenomenon. However, as the ties 
between crime and terror grow ever closer, some might suggest that her original 
continuum has become outdated. Even Makarenko herself has conceded that the original 
continuum needs an update (as evidenced by her release of a refined, unidirectional 
model in 2009 (European Parliament, 2012)). Her intent, presumably, was to elucidate 
the possibility of transformation following the convergence of crime and terror. She also 
eliminated the “black hole” of failed states.  
 
(SEE APPENDIX B) 
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Makarenko’s new model is useful in depicting path that groups can follow as they 
begin to cooperate with the other side. Perhaps a better model, however, would show the 
possibility of movement along the continuum, depending on the situation. A weakness of 
Makarenko’s model is that implies that groups can only move in one direction, toward 
convergence and transformation. However, as the examples of al-Qaeda and Mexican 
cartels have shown, groups can move along the spectrum in both directions. When the 
situation calls for it, they may form alliances to achieve a goal. In other instances, they 
will adopt the other side’s methodologies. And in other instances, they will temporarily 
set aside their overarching goals for the sake of focusing on more pressing matters. A re-
conception of Makarenko’s continuum is yet again necessary to explore the relationship 
between crime and terror.  
 In this new model, the original continuum will serve as the foundation, minus the 
black hole. The addition of overlapping circles meant to represent crime and terror 
separately, in the form of a Venn diagram, adds a dimensionality to the original 
continuum. It suggests that placing a group at a given space along the continuum is a 
temporary location that could move to anywhere else in the cloud. Placing a group in the 
Venn diagram is less finite than placing them at a fixed location on a line.  The black hole 
should be removed from the continuum because it refers to a specific failed state and 
neglects the transnational nature of modern-day organized crime and international 
terrorism. Furthermore, it represents a byproduct of cooperation, rather than an actual 
form of cooperation itself. That is not to say that the black hole should be removed all 
together. Rather, it should be placed in a location adjacent to the continuum. This clearly 
shows that it is a byproduct of cooperation between criminals and terrorists. This also 
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allows for the addition of other characteristics that are needed to move a state into the 
black hole category. Kaldor (2007) would suggest that the presence of “new wars,” most 
commonly in the form of ethnic conflict, is an impetus for creating a failed state. The 
inability to find a resolution to the conflict and what she refers to as the “globalized war 
economy” is what allows crime and terror to fester and take hold of the country. This can 
be seen to have taken place in Somalia, where the terrorist organization al-Shabaab 
exacerbated the conflict, hindered the installation of an effective government, and aided 
in the establishment of an illicit war economy trading in weapons.  Pre-existing conflict is 
not the only necessity to move a state into the black hole (Kaldor, 2007). One should also 
consider the amount of corruption and the strength of rule of law. Shelley (2005) 
identifies “the unholy trinity”- transnational crime, corruption, and terrorism- as a major 
threat to state stability. Once again, a conflict economy is established whereby criminals 
and terrorists alike have an interest in prolonging conflict in order to continue making 
money. In this situation, corrupt governments and weak law enforcement can contribute 
to the growth of crime and terror. The Balkans and Chechnya exemplify this 
phenomenon. In these countries, “international crime and terrorist networks particularly 
intersect… where law enforcement and border control agencies are both corrupt and, in 
some cases, entirely collusive with the crime groups (Shelley, 2005, pg. 103).” Finally, 
by placing the Black Hole adjacent to the continuum, it becomes clear that a failed state 
is not a prerequisite in order to achieve the pinnacle of convergence. Given the 
increasingly transnational nature of these groups, a defined territory is no longer a 
necessity for operations. Terrorists and criminals can operate anywhere, and can move 
operations relatively easily. Consider the example of FARC. Colombia is not a failed 
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state, but the argument could easily be made that the group has achieved ultimate 
convergence, as shown above. Similarly Abu Sayyaf is an offshoot of al-Qaeda that 
operates predominately in the Philippines.  Scholars have suggested that they have also 
achieved convergence through the increasing use on kidnapping for ransom. The group 
has also begun to move away from its terrorist roots (Makarenko, 2003). This group is 
simultaneously criminal and terrorist, despite the Philippines continuing as a functioning 
state.  
 
(SEE APPENDIX C) 
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VI. COMBATTING THE NEXUS 
 
Given this threat posed by the cooperation between criminals and terrorists, what 
implications does this have for national security and law enforcement? In places like the 
United States and the European Union, the probability of becoming a weak or failed state 
is highly unlikely. That does not mean they are immune to the threat, though. As the 
targets of many terrorist organizations and as the receiving countries for many of the 
drugs trafficked by these groups, the impact of the convergence of crime and terror is still 
felt in the US and the EU. There are steps that can be taken to alleviate this threat. 
Unfortunately, because they are not dealing with traditional state actors, the traditional 
options of deterrence and diplomacy are rendered ineffective. The groups do not always 
act as rational actors and their behavior can be unpredictable, especially when 
considering terrorist groups today (Makarenko, 2008).  
Rather than pursuing traditional tactics that a state may use to negotiate and settle 
disputes with other states, three general techniques should guide policy making when 
attempting to combat crime and terror together. The first technique is a practical one, 
relating to the investigation and prosecution of criminals and terrorists. It is one 
suggested by former attorney general John Ashcroft- the Capone method. Using this 
technique, law enforcement agencies and intelligence groups should exhaust every 
available lead to find some charge for individuals operating in crime and terrorism. In the 
case of Al Capone, the government knew they couldn’t prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Capone was involved in murder, bribery, and running illegal breweries. They could, 	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however, prove that he was evading taxes. Following on this, Capone was arrested and 
entered prison in 1932 (Gartenstein-Ross and Dabruzzi, 2007). On using the Capone 
method to seek out terrorists, Ashcroft said:  
Robert Kennedy’s Justice Department, it is said, would arrest mobsters for 
“spitting on the sidewalk” if it would help in the battle against organized crime. It 
has been and will be the policy of this Department of Justice to use the same 
aggressive arrest and detention tactics in the war on terror. Let the terrorists 
among us be warned: If you overstay your visa—even by one day—we will arrest 
you. … We will use every available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial 
advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and under the Constitution 
(as quoted in Gartenstein-Ross and Dabruzzi, 2007). 
Though the Capone method may not result in the arrest of “terrorists” for terrorism and 
“mob bosses” for leading organized crime groups it does play a role in stopping those 
who might otherwise commit crimes and acts of terrorism. It provides an impediment to 
their day-to-day activities. The arrest of Joaqin “El Chapo” Guzman, head of the Sinaloa 
drug cartel in Mexico is an example of the Capone method. Though he ultimately 
escaped from prison and was able to resume his business, the general concept in his arrest 
is still relevant. Captured in Guatemala in 1993 and extradited to Mexico, Guzman was 
sentenced to over twenty years in prison for drug trafficking, criminal association, and 
bribery. Mexican law enforcement charged Guzman with everything they could to ensure 
that he got the longest sentence possible.  
 Another important technique is the use of dissuasion. That is, efforts need to be 
taken to win “the hearts and minds of individuals who may be considered vulnerable to 
radicalization (Makarenko, 2008, pg. 70).” In the broader sense, this could mean 
alleviating political conditions which would foster terrorism as well as alleviating 
economic perils that would lead to the development of a black market economy. The EU 
has been especially active in this approach, as can be seen through the impressive 
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amounts of foreign aid and initiatives like the European Neighborhood Program. The US 
has also explored the idea of dissuasion. In 2001, it became one of four defense goals, 
along with assurance, deterrence, and defeat. Its importance was reiterated when it again 
made an appearance in the 2005 National Defense Strategy and the 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (Lutes and Bunn, 2008). Finally, the importance of information sharing, 
between agencies and national governments, cannot be underestimated. Criminal 
investigators and intelligence agencies need to share their findings in order to create a 
complete picture of what is happening. Without this information sharing, key aspects of 
the relationship between crime and terror can easily be missed and efficiency in 
investigation can be lost.  
 In conclusion, as criminal and terrorist organizations find new ways to work 
together, governments must anticipate their changes in modus operandi in order to be 
effective against them. Steps have been taken that would indicate an understanding of this 
relationship. The United Kingdom, for example, passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and 
Security Act in 2001. This act not only increased measures that could be taken against 
terrorists, but included language regarding financial crimes and crime prevention. It 
recognized that there was a link between criminals and terrorists and took measures to 
address it. Similarly, the United States passed the USA PATRIOT Act following the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. This Act also drew attention to the cooperation 
between crime and terror and, though it was predominately aimed at terrorism, included 
provisions to increase information sharing and to allow investigators to use readily 
available tools to investigate both organized crime and terrorism. United States Congress 
also drafted the Vital Interdiction of Criminal Terrorist Organizations (“VICTORY”) Act 
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of 2003. This act would clearly define narco-terrorism and take measures to prosecute 
drug traffickers thought to be aiding terrorists more stringently. The European Union has 
also taken a strong stance against the crime-terror nexus, extending all anti-terrorism 
tools to be used in anti-crime measures as well. Furthermore, the European Arrest 
Warrant, EUROPOL, and EUROJUST are all tools meant to facilitate information 
sharing and to increase cooperation in investigating crime and terror. It is clear that 
governments are taking the steps necessary to combat organized crime and terrorism 
simultaneously. By pursuing organized crime and terrorism with the same legislation, 
both issues are securitized to the same degree and should therefore be given equal weight 
in the appropriation of resources. While each may require different tactics in terms of 
pursuit of perpetrators- an organized crime group may be better pursued with law 
enforcement whereas terrorists may be more effectively pursued militarily- when it 
comes to prosecution, the same general principles can be applied because the groups 
cooperate so closely. It is important, however, that they acknowledge the continuously 
changing shape of the relationship and anticipate new forms of cooperation. Only by 
keeping a constant watch on the way criminals and terrorists behave will they be able to 
prosecute both crimes at once.  
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APPENDIX B: MAKARENKO’S REVISED CONTINUUM, RELEASED IN 2009, 
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APPENDIX C: PROPOSED CONTINUUM 
 
  
	   Organized Crime Terrorism 





+ Corruption, poor 
rule of law, weak 
governance, etc.  
Black Hole 
	  	  37	  
WORKS CITED 
 
Abadinsky, Howard. Organized Crime. 9th ed. Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 
2010. Print. 
 
"Albania." Wilson Center, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/Albania>. Web. 
 
Associated Press. “Colombian Rebels Linked to Mexico Drug Cartels.” The New York 
Times 07 October 2008. World sec.  
 
Bergen, Peter. "Should We Still Fear Al Qaeda?" CNN. Cable News Network, 3 Feb. 
2013. Web. 
 
Berry, LaVerle, Glenn E. Curtis, Rex A. Hudson, and Nina A. Kollars. A Global 
Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups. Rep. 
Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2002. 
 
Burke, Jason. "Al-Qaeda." Foreign Policy May-June 2004: 18+. 
 
Burton, Fred. “Dispatch: Expanding Reach of Mexico’s Drug Cartels.” Stratfor 17 June 
2010.  
 
Bovenkerk, Frank, and Bashir Abon Chakra. "Terrorism and Organized Crime." 
Terrorism, Organized Crime, and Corruption. Ed. Leslie Holmes. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Limited, 2007. 29-41. Print. 
 
Chilson, Peter. "Al-Qaeda Country." Foreign Policy. 15 Jan. 2013. Web. 
 
"Colombia FARC Rebels End Unilateral Ceasefire." BBC News. BBC, 20 Jan. 2013. 
Web. 
 
Ehrenfeld, Rachel. Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed-- and How to Stop It. 
Chicago: Bonus, 2003. Print. 
 
Ehrenfeld, Karen. "Drug Trafficking, Kidnapping Fund Al Qaeda." Editorial. CNN.com. 
CNN, 03 May 2011. 
 
Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in 
the European Union. Rep. Brussels: European Parliament, 2012. 
 
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, and Kyle Dabruzzi. "The Convergence of Crime and Terror: 
Law Enforcement Opportunities and Perils." Policing Terrorism Report 1 (2007): 
n. pag. The Manhattan Institute. Web. 
 
Grant, Will (a). "Mexico Steps up Hunt for Drug Lord Joaquin Guzman." BBC News 10 
Jan. 2012. 
	  	  38	  
 
Grant, Will (b). “Mexico Violence: Fear and Intimidation.” BBC News 14 May 2012.  
 
Hanson, Stephanie. "FARC, ELN: Colombia's Left-Wing Guerrillas." Council on 
Foreign Relations. N.p., 19 Aug. 2009. Web. 
 
Hossain, Farhana and Xaquin G.V. “The Reach of Mexico’s Drug Cartels.” The New 
York Times 11 September 2011. U.S. sec. 
 
Kaldor, Mary. New & Old Wars. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2007. Print. 
 
Keefe, Patrick Radden. "How a Mexican Drug Cartel Makes Its Billions." New York 
Times Magazine 15 June 2012. 
 
Lefkowitz, Josh. The Crime-Terror Nexus. Rep. New York City: New York State Office 
of Homeland Security, 2006. 
 
Lewis, Roger. "Drugs, War, and Crime in the Post-Soviet Balkans." The New European 
Criminology: Crime and Social Order in Europe. Ed. Vincenzo Ruggiero, Nigel 
South, and Ian Taylor. New York: Routledge, 1998. 216-29. Print. 
 
Makarenko, Tamara. ""The Ties That Bind": Uncovering the Relationship Between 
Organized Crime and Terrorism." Global Organized Crime: Trends and 
Developments. Ed. Dina Siegel, Henk Van De Bunt, and Damián Zaitch. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2003. 159-74. Print. 
 
Makarenko, Tamara. "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between 
Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism." Global Crime 6.1 (2004): 129-
145. 
 
Makarenko, Tamara. "Criminal and Terrorist Networks: Gauging Interaction and the 
Resultant Impact on Counter-Terrorism." Five Dimensions of Homeland and 
International Security. Ed. Esther Brimmer. Washington D.C.: Center for 
Transatlantic Relations, 2008. 57-72. Print. 
 
McCloud, Kimberly, Gary A. Ackerman, and Jeffrey M. Bale. "Al-Qa'ida's WMD 
Activities." James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 13 May 2005. 
Web. 
 
Mosettig, Michael D. "Colombian Government and FARC to Begin Formal 
Negotiations." PBS Newshour. PBS, 15 Oct. 2012. Web. 
 
Mutschke, Ralk. "Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug 
Trafficking, and Terrorism." Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the 
Committee on the Judiciary. N.p., 13 Dec. 2000. Web. 
 
	  	  39	  
O’Reilly, Andrew. “Mexican Drug Cartels Join Forces with Italian Mafia to Supply 
Cocaine to Europe.” Fox News Latino 21 June 2012.  
 
Pontoniere, Paolo. "In Italy, Al Qaeda Turns to Organized Crime for Protection." New 
American Media. N.p., 21 Oct. 2005. Web. 
 
Shelly, Louise. “Identifying, Counting, and Categorizing Transnational Organized 
Crime.” Transnational Organized Crime 5.1 (1999): PAGES. 
 
Shelley, Louise. "The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism." 
Brown Journal of World Affairs 11.2 (2005): 101-11. Web. 
 
Simonsen, Clifford E., and Jeremy R. Spindlove. Terrorism Today. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2004. Print. 
 
Stewart, Scott. "Defining Al-Qaeda." Stratfor. Stratfor, 18 Oct. 2012. 
 
Toros, H. "`We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist 
Conflicts." Security Dialogue 39.4 (2008): 407-26. 
 
United States. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, 
Investigations and Management. A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Terror, 
and Violence on the Southwest Border. Nov. 2012. Web. 
 
Williams, Paul L. The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime, 
and the Coming Apocalypse. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005. Print. 
 
Xhudo, Gus. "Men of Purpose: The Growth of Albanian Criminal Activity." Trends in 
Organized Crime 2.3 (1997): 84-86. 
 
